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Abstract: The study examined the degree of market power in the export demand for Nigerian Cocoa with 
focus on the Dutch Market. The study covered the periods of 1961–2007 and data comprised published 
national aggregates on specific trade and macroeconomic variables from reputable sources. Two Stage Least 
Squares (2 SLS) approach was used in the estimation after instrumenting for simultaneity and establishing 
stationarity alongside cointegration relationship. Findings, on the demand side, showed that the demand for 
cocoa increases as income of Netherlands (importing country) increases. Total production of the non–
participating countries traced out a positive relationship with demand for cocoa by the importing country 
while the coefficient of price of Coffee (substitute crop) possessed a negative sign. On the supply relation side, 
the demand for the export crop has a negative sign, indicating decreasing marginal output with respect to 
cost while the proxy for ocean freight rate with its negative sign, imply increasing export cost. The result 
further showed that there is relative competitiveness in the Dutch market on the strength of a market power 
coefficient -0.712 with a Lerner index of 0.122. Based on the findings, the study calls for government 
intervention in the agricultural export subsector with the aim to revitalize the country’s agricultural export 
capacity and enhance her market power via increased market shares. These interventions could be in the 
form of input/production subsidies, targeted export promotion programs, farm settlement, expanded export 
processing zones to mention but a few. 
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1. Introduction and Literature Review 
 
Agricultural export has played a prominent role in Nigeria’s economic development. Drawing its strength 
from the largest sector (agriculture), such important roles include contribution to employment, food 
production, foreign exchange and industrial inputs (Omonona et al, 2007). Among the export crops from 
Nigeria, Cocoa is the most prominent in terms of production and export capacities. Since the introduction of 
the crop into Nigeria in about 1874 (Oyedele, 2007), it has grown to be a major export crop. Nigeria is the 
third largest producer of cocoa in Africa, producing about 12 percent of the total world production behind 
Ivory Coast which produces 35 percent and Ghana’s 13 percent (Wilcox and Abbot, 2004). Currently, the 
production capacity of cocoa in Nigeria has reached about 385, 000 metric tonnes per annum, an increase of 
215, 000 metric tonnes from year 2000 production level. This disposition places Nigeria as the fourth highest 
cocoa producing nation in the world after Ivory Coast, Indonesia and Ghana (Erelu, 2008). In Nigeria, Cocoa is 
largely produced on a small scale and the average delivery per farmer is less than 5 bags (roughly 300kg per 
hectare of cocoa) per season. In terms of capacity, Ondo State is rated as the largest cocoa producing state in 
Nigeria (Oluyole, 2005). 
 
Prior to the oil boom era in Nigeria, cocoa, cotton, groundnut, oil palm products and rubber were the 
principal export crops but with export re-orientation, only cocoa remained of any importance after 1975. 
With assistance from the World Bank, the government restored cocoa production in the late 1970s and 1980s 
through replanting programs and producer price supports. Despite those efforts, downward trend in 
Nigeria’s non-oil export to which cocoa belongs has been observed. This was touted to result from the 
collapse of the international primary commodity markets with the associated deterioration in the terms of 
trade (Nwachukwu et al., 2010). Nigeria seems to have an added advantage over major agricultural producers 
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and exporters in the Eastern and Southern Africa in terms of fertile land, proximity to traditional and terminal 
markets in Europe by air or by sea (Sasore, 2004). Roughly all the agricultural exports from Africa go to the 
European Union and America and almost in its primary form without any appreciable value addition. 
 
As an index of degree of competitiveness of the industry, market power reflects the wedge between price and 
marginal cost. Its existence is tied to the demand conditions the firm faces. Market power issues in the 
agricultural sector have received increasing attention as firms consolidate throughout the marketing chain 
(Sexton and Zhang, 2001). Although consolidation itself does not automatically pre – destine a sector to 
imperfect competition, it is an often cited characteristic that may increase the incidence of market power. 
Imperfect competition is common in international agricultural commodity markets. Agricultural commodities 
are commonly produced in certain countries due to natural conditions and consumed all over the world. This 
situation enables a small number of countries or even a single country to dominate export shares in the world 
market, which potentially induce market power mechanism (Susanto, 2006). 
 
Over time, there seemed to be a downward trend in Nigeria’s non-oil export resulting from the collapse of the 
international primary commodity markets with the associated deterioration in the terms of trade. However, 
for the agricultural export subsector in Nigeria, because the export commodities are in their primary forms, 
international prices have generally been on the decline and unattractive. This is in addition to Nigeria’s often 
volatile foreign exchange regimes which have rendered farmer’s incomes (producer prices) from export static 
at best, if not dropping; hence it becomes fairly difficult to sustain production. This is particularly true in 
Nigeria where production costs are generally high and immobile (Daramola et al., 2007). It has also been 
observed that those unfavorable domestic terms of trade for agricultural exports, loss of market power and 
declining output are the principal contributors to the dismal performance of traditional exports, and those 
factors reflect in the interaction of inappropriate domestic pricing policies and external shocks. It is hoped 
that the outcome of this study will form a formidable basis for formulating appropriate sub – sectoral policies 
and dependable platform for taking informed decisions cum act as a reference to further studies. As such, 
wider interest will be stimulated in this study area and attention drawn to the need for redefining, 
revitalizing and re-diversifying Nigeria’s economic prosperity. In the light of the foregoing, the study aimed to 




Sources of Data: The data employed were national aggregates that were obtained from secondary sources. 
The data covered the periods 1961 – 2007. The major sources include several issues of the Production 
Yearbook published by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), FAOSTAT website, the National Bureau 
of Statistics (NBS) Annual Abstract of Statistics and several issues of the Central Bank of Nigeria’s (CBN) 
Annual Reports and Statement of Accounts, United Nations and World Bank databases. 
 
Theoretical Framework: The theoretical framework adopted for this study is the New Empirical Industrial 
Organization (NEIO) in the form of oligopoly model. It emerged due to the dissatisfaction with the Structure – 
Conduct – Performance (SCP) framework which dominated empirical work in 1960s and 1970s (Sexton, 
2000). This is because it provides a general model of industry pricing within which it is possible to model 
competition, monopoly and all degrees of oligopoly. Suppose that an industry consisting of n-firms produces a 
homogenous output with identical costs. The market demand function can be written as: 
                                               Qt = Q(Pt, Zt) ………………….(1) 
Where Pt is the single price in the market and Qt is the total quantity consumed at time t (industry output). Zt 
is a vector of exogenous variables that shift the demand for Qt. Since price and output are simultaneously 
determined, the demand function can equally be written as: 
                                             Pt = P(Qt, Zt) ……………………………………(2) 
Equations (1) and (2) are assumed to be well behaved such that they obey the following conditions: (a) P(0) 
is greater than zero, which ensures that there are positive prices, (b) The demand is downward sloping, that 
is if Q > 0 and P(Q) > 0, then P’ (Q) <0, and (c) The demand curve cuts both axes such that if Q > 0, then QP(Q) 
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< M  where M is a finite number. Condition (c) imposes a bound on total revenue and eliminates any chance 
for firms to have infinite profits. 
In a standard economic form, total revenue (R) equals the product of price and quantity demanded:  
                                     Rt = PtQt………………………………………………..…(3)  
  Hence perceived marginal revenue, MRt (λ), is given by  
     MRt (λ) = P(Qt, Zt) + λQt           ∂Pt  (Qt, Zt )        
                                                            ∂Qt                ……..………………………..…...(4) 
Where λ in (4) is a new parameter to be estimated that can be interpreted as an index of the degree of 
competitiveness of the industry, reflecting the wedge between price and marginal cost. As will be shown 
subsequently, λ also nests an index of the beliefs that other firms react to their output choices, i.e. a 
“conjectural variations” parameter. The numerical value of λ is a constant between zero and one. If the firms 
in the industry act like price takers, then λ= 0 and perceived marginal revenue equals price (the profit 
maximization solution for perfect competition). That is, these firms act as though they face a horizontal 
demand curve at an exogenously determined price. When λ=1, the industry behaves as a monopolist or 
perfect cartel, which gives the solution of perceived marginal revenue equals marginal costs. An intermediate 
λ’s correspond to oligopoly or monopolistic competitive concepts. Under Cournot model, for instance, λ = 1/n 
since each firm in the industry produces the same amount at equilibrium conditions. 
Providing that the aggregate cost function is given by: 
                 Ct = C(Qt, Wt) …………………………………………………...(5) 
Where Ct is total cost of producing Qt and Wt is a vector of exogenous cost-shifters, the equilibrium condition 
for the industry is achieved when perceived marginal revenue equals marginal cost. This relationship can be 
written as 
  P(Qt, Zt) + λQt     ∂Pt  (Qt, Zt )        =   ∂C (Qt, Zt )   ………………….…….(6) 
                                                         ∂Qt                                            ∂Qt 
This can also equivalently be written as 
P(Qt, Zt) = ∂C (Qt, Zt ) -  λQt       ∂Pt  (Qt, Zt )   ………………….……………….………..(7) 
                       ∂Qt                           ∂Qt                                    
Equation (7) is usually called the general supply relation because it allows for non-price taking conduct and is 
central to the inferences drawn about market power in any particular study. By estimating equation (2), one 
can obtain an estimate of the slope of the demand curve, ∂Pt(Qt, Zt)/ ∂Qt . Furthermore, based on that estimate 
and an estimate of the optimality equation (6) or (7), one can obtain an estimate of λ and MC, where marginal 
cost (MC) is assumed to be constant with respect to output. That is, estimating equation (7) will give an 
estimate of the product λ and the demand slope of equation (2). The index of market power λ can be obtained 
through dividing this composite parameter by the slope of the inverse demand obtained from estimating (2). 
At this point, it is worth noting that the parameter of market power λ has many interpretations. There are two 
possible interpretations of λ. First, λ is a measure of the equilibrium wedge between price and marginal cost. 
This interpretation, which Perloff (1992) called the general interpretation of λ can be demonstrated by 
equation (9) where  
 Pt (.) - ∂C(.)/∂Qt  = - λQt (∂Pt (.)/∂Qt …………………………………………. (8)   
In several empirical studies, an index is employed to measure market power generally called the Lerner 
Index. Using Lerner index of monopoly power, one can demonstrate the following results 
L = P – MC = - λQt (∂Pt (.)/∂Qt ) = λ 
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          P                     P                     ε ………………………………..………….…..     (9) 
Where ε is the market demand elasticity. Therefore, λ can be interpreted as an index of market power or 
structure 
Method of Data Analysis and Model Specification: The method used is two stage least squares approach. 
This is based on the fact that there is simultaneous relationship between the variables. In order to evaluate 
the degree of market power in Netherlands, equations 1 and 7 were invoked and implicitly stated thus: 
Qi  = α0 + α1Pit + α2Pst + α3It  + α4PIit + α5Wit + εit ………………………………..……....(10) 
Where Qi  = the quantity of export crop to destination country i 
            Pit = Real export price of the crop 
            Pst = Real export price of coffee (substitute crop) in the destination country  
            It   = Income proxied by the GDP of Netherlands (destination country) 
            PIit =The interaction term, which is the product of Pst and Iit. 
            Wit = Total production of the export crop excluding participating  
                    countries in the destination market 
             α;s = Parameters to be estimated 
             εit  =  Error term 
Following Bresnahan (1989); Buschena and Perloff (1991) and Susanto (2006), suppose that the aggregate 
marginal cost of production takes the following functional form: 
 




 MCt  =  Marginal cost 
 Vt      =  Variable cost of producing the export crop proxied by a ratio of the producer price     
                        (in local currency) to a measure of the domestic price. This models the cost of  
                         production 
Ct   =    Ocean freight rate proxied by the ratio of the export price to the producer price     
           was used. The price paid to producers represents a cost to exporters 
 
Applying the condition for equilibrium in an imperfectly competitive industry where perceived industry 
marginal revenue is equal to the marginal cost, we have the optimality equation (supply relation) and 
specified thus:  
    Pit  = Ø0 + ØaQit + ØbVt + ØcCt  + λ      Qit           +  ηit .........................................................(12)              
                                                                  α1 + α4It           
All variables are as previously defined and λ is an index of market power. 
Rearranging equation (12),  
Pit  = α0 + α1Qi + α2Pst + α3It  + α4PIit + α5Wit + εit ……………………………………….…...(13) 
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On the basis of theory, Qi is observed to be endogenous and has to be instrumented if statistical test indicates 
potential simultaneity between Qt and Pt. 
Since the own quantity Qt in equations (10) and (11) is potentially endogenous because of the simultaneous 
relationship with own price, Pt, Hausman specification test was implemented following the reduced form 
equation employed to obtain an instrumental variable. 
Qt = βn IVn  + εit …………………………………………………………………………..….(14) 
Where: 
IV denotes instrumental variables – a vector of exogenous or predetermined variables which are strongly 
correlated with Qt but not correlated with the error term. 
βn  = Vector of coefficients to be estimated 
εit  = Error term  
The IV includes all the exogenous variables in the demand and optimality equations. 
The instrumented demand and optimality equations are thus:  
Qi  = α0 + α1Pit + α2Pst + α3It  + α4PIit + α5Wit + εit …………………………………………..(15) 
Pit  = Ø0 + ØaQit + ØbVt + ØcCt  + λ        Qit           +  ηit ..........................................................(16)              
                                                               α1 + α4It           
From the simultaneous equations above, the endogenous variables are:  
Qit = the quantity of export crop to destination country i 
Pit  = Real Export Price of the crop (instrumented) 
 
The pre – determined variables are: 
Pst = Real export price of substitute crop in the destination country  
It    = Income proxied by the GDP of the destination country 
PIit = The interaction term, which is the product of Pst and Iit. 
Wit = Total production of the export crop excluding participating countries in the destination market. 
Vt  = Variable cost of producing the export crop proxied by the ratio of producer price to the domestic price 
Ct   = Ocean freight rates proxied by the ratio of export price to the producer price, reflecting cost                    of 
export 
  λ  = Market power index 
The model is overidentified and thus was estimated with two – stage least squares (2SLS) given its 
simultaneous equation posture. The approach (order condition) for solving the identification problem 
followed Thomas (2007) who averred that if the equality sign is satisfied, that is if (K – M) = (G – 1), the 
equation is exactly identified. If the inequality sign holds, that is, if (K – M) > (G – 1), the equation is over 
identified. Where: 
G = total number of equations (= total number of endogenous variables). 
K = number of total variables in the model (endogenous and predetermined) 
M = number of variables, endogenous and exogenous, included in a particular equation. 
 The lerner index is stated thus: 
L = P – MC = - λQt (∂Pt (.)/∂Qt ) = λ 
         P                     P                      ε ………………..……………..………………..(17) 
 




Summary Statistics of the Data: The summary statistics for all the variables employed in the study within 
the period of the study, 1961-2007 are presented in Table 1. All the price variables were deflated using 
consumer price index (CPI) in conformity with Susanto (2006). Based on trade statistics of FAO (2009), 
Netherlands was selected on the strength of her consistency over the years as Nigeria’s trading partners in 
Cocoa. The major participating countries in the Dutch market employed by the study are Cameroun, Cote 
d’Ivore, Ghana, Indonesia and Malaysia and they were chosen based on the fact that they supply at least 1000 
tonnes per annum to the market. 
 
During the study period, the minimum and maximum total export quantity of cocoa was 9,289.00 tonnes and 
305,550 tonnes with a mean of 180,331.83 tonnes. The corresponding standard deviation of the quantity 
exported was 46,386.38, implying variability in the data over the period. The gap between the minimum and 
maximum values of both crops was quite large, which implied that there had been tremendous increase in 
their export volumes during the period of study. Similar increases were also recorded in the quantity of cocoa 
exported to Netherlands during the period. The export price of the commodity showed similar upward trend 
during the sample period. The difference between the minimum and maximum prices for cocoa was 
$2,426.91 per tonne representing 179.10 percent increase. Probably, increase in price may have contributed 
to increase in the quantity exported in line with theory. More so, the price of substitutes (coffee) rose 
tremendously. The gross domestic product (GDP) showed an upward trend as revealed by the difference 
between the minimum and maximum values. This reflected enhanced prosperity of the importing country. 
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics of the Data 
Variable                                   Mean               Minimum      Maximum         Std. Dev 
Export quantity (tonnes)                    180331.83          9289.00      305550.00          46386.38 
Export Value ($000)                    226878.49          28695.00                638328.00          120537.75 
Export quantity to Netherlands (t) 30556.93             7183.00                  147595.00          38153.38 
Export price ($/000)                    1355.09               391.00                      3782.00          716.55 
Export price of substitute ($)           1740.11               639.00                      4487.00          974.09 
Producer price (N)                   96035.62            10158.00     267435.00                47716.17 
World prod. less 
Participating Countries (t)                1119198.21       412784.00     11162885.00           1560316.05 
GDP of importing 
Country ($b)                    240.04                  15.29          776.12           198.91 
Value of Agric. Export                        12938340.15     471901.00    6605000.00               13295894.01 
Value of World Agric. Export           3.20                  0.14     14.00                           3.31 
Real Exchange rate                   74.50                  0.02     201.00           72.26 
Annual average rainfall (mm)         1295.8                  897.00                    1597.00           172.05 
 
Preliminary Tests (Stationarity and Cointegration tests): The variables for both the demand function and 
supply relation of cocoa exports was subjected to stationarity and cointegration tests in line with time series 
econometrics and their results presented in Tables 2. It could be observed in Table 2 that all the variables 
that were subjected to the ADF unit root test were not stationary in their level form for cocoa at all levels of 
significance. On application of the ADF test on their first difference terms after logging, they became 
stationary as shown by the values of the ADF test, which are larger (in absolute terms) than the standard 
critical values. 
 
To also confirm stationarity, the variables were also subjected to PP test which was believed to give robust 
estimates. All the variables became stationary in their first difference terms. Hence, they are integrated of 
order one, 1(1). 
 
Table 2: Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron (PP) Tests for Integration Order for Cocoa 
Variable           ADF      PP 
                                                1(0)               1(1)                   1(0                      1(1) 
Qt   :                                       -3.09                         -4.471                  -3.173                -4.191 
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Pt   :        -2.997                       -4.990                  -3.101                -4.201 
Pst :                         -2.241                       -4.325                  -3.112                -4.182 
It   :       -3.024                        -7.290                  -2.379                -5.463 
PIt :       -3.039                        -4.764                  -3.115                -4.634 
Wt :       -2.690                        -4.863                  -3.038                -4.032 
Ct  :            -3.018                        -4.895                  -2.618                -6.697 
Vt  :            -3.117                        -4.982                  -2.817                -4.877 
NB: Critical values of ADF at 1%(***), 5%(**) and 10%(*) are -4.196, -3.520 and -3.192 respectively. The PP 
test critical values at 1%(***), 5%(**) and 10%(*) are -4.187, -3.516 and -3.190 respectively. 
The co integration test was preceded by the performance of ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation on the 
variables in levels to estimate the long run relationship. The residuals generated from the OLS estimation 
were subjected to the cointegration test. The results of the cointegration test for demand function and supply 
relation for the export commodity are presented in Table 3. The result of the residual based cointegration test 
showed that the regression residual of both the demand function and supply relation for cocoa were 
stationary. Both the ADF and PP tests were applied but the critical values of the latter were relied upon. 
Dittmann (2002) argued that Phillips-Perron test when applied to residual based cointegration determination 
is more powerful than the ADF test. Based on the critical values, it could be inferred that there exists a 
cointegration relationship in both demand function and supply relation equations for cocoa. 
 
Table 3: Results of Residual Based Cointegration Test for Nigerian Cocoa 
Model           ADF                    PP 
Demand Function        -2.750***   -2.751*** 
Supply Relation         -3.562***   -3.562*** 
NB: Critical values of ADF at 1%(***), 5%(**) and 10%(*) are -2.641, -1.950 and -1.607 respectively. 
 
Prior to estimation and given that own quantity was potentially endogenous because of the presence of 
simultaneous relationship with own price, Hausman specification test was performed and the result shown in 
Table 4. It could be observed that there is simultaneity since the results are significant and the null hypothesis 
of no simultaneity between Pit and Qit rejected at 5% level of probability for Cocoa. 
 
Table 4: Results of Simultaneity Test 
Export Crop Destination Country    Test Statistics     Simultaneity 
Cocoa       Netherlands        2.307**  Yes 
 
Market Power Estimation by Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS): Having found that the model is 
overidentifed after the simultaneity test, the two stage least squares (2SLS) method was applied in order to 
realize unbiased and consistent estimates and the results presented in Table 5. In the demand function for 
cocoa export, the coefficients of the income of Netherlands (importing country) and total production of non – 
participating countries have positive coefficients and are statistically significant at 1% probability level. Real 
export price of substitute crop (Coffee) possessed a negative coefficient and significant at 5 % level of 
probability. The positive sign implies that the quantity demanded by the importing country increases as their 
income and world production excluding participating countries increase. The direct relationship between 
income and quantity demanded is in tandem with the theory of demand as reported by Adegeye and Dittoh 
(1985). However, the sign identity of the total production of non – participating countries contradicts a priori 
expectation based on the understanding that non – participants’ production increases as demand for the 
commodity from Nigeria increases. This can only hold true if the cocoa beans from Nigeria have much higher 
quality than those from most other countries. 
 
The negative sign possessed by the coefficient of price of the substitute crop is not in line with a priori 
expectation and established demand theory. Although the outcome is surprising, one possible reason is that 
import decisions are often motivated by political rather than economic rationale. Over the years, Netherlands 
has remained one of Nigeria’s trading partners which show that their bilateral relations have been cordial. 
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More so, Coffee the substitute crop may not have enjoyed consistent patronage over the years in the 
Netherlands market. 
 
In the supply relation, the quantity of cocoa exported had a negative sign which indicates decreasing marginal 
output with respect to cost. This is plausible since Nigeria falls within the rank of developing nations and has 
been operating below optimal capacity. Nkang et al (2006) averred that negative elasticity could probably be 
attributable to failure of farmers to replace their old and low – yielding cocoa trees with high yielding ones. 
Beyond this, rising production costs especially labour costs are known to partially offset output price 
increases. The ocean freight rate which was proxied by rate of export price to producer price had a negative 
coefficient. This result is consistent with Deodhar and Sheldon (1997) who had a similar sign for ocean 
freight rate in their study on market power in the world market for soy meal exports. 
 
The coefficient of market power was quite high in magnitude (-0.714) and significant at 1% probably level. 
Applying the Lerner index, it was realized that the Cocoa had a Lerner index of 0.122. Given its magnitude, the 
Dutch market for cocoa is competitive. This probably accounts for continued patronage of cocoa beans from 
Nigeria despite increased production by non – participating countries. With respect to the negative sign of the 
index, Sperling (2002) reported that the negative coefficient of the market power parameter implied an 
oligopoly mark up, indicating that exporters are better off under monopoly rather than a mark down. 
According to De Wulf (2004), a good is competitive if it can coexist with imports where domestic production 
is not sufficient to satisfy the domestic market, and can be exported when it is in surplus supply. In case it is 
not competitive, the commodity needs to be protected against imports to let production take place at all in the 
country, and the commodity cannot be exported. Given that market power is interpreted as an index of 
degree of competitiveness of the industry, it could be inferred that Nigeria has competitive advantage in the 
export of Cocoa to the Dutch market.  
 
In terms of the diagnostic statistics, the demand function and supply relation of export crop have appreciable 
R2 estimates and F – ratios, implying reasonable explanation of variations in the quantity demanded and 
overall significance of the model respectively. The DW estimates showed absence of autocorrelation in the 
model given that it fell within 1.5 – 2.5 range. 
 
Table 5: Estimation of Market Power of Cocoa Export in the Dutch Market using 2SLS 
Variable          Cocoa 
Export Demand 
Intercept           11.531*** 
       (2.930) 
Real export price                                      0.951 
        (0.244) 
Real export price of substitute           -0.802** 
       (-2.038) 
GDP of destination market                       7.284 
        (2.840) 
Interaction term                                      -0.553 
        (-0.155) 
World prod. less market participants          0.497*** 
        (2.818) 
R2                                                     0.529 
F – Ratio              7.639 
Supply Relation 
Export quantity                                      -0.877*** 
    (-2.812) 
Variable cost of production                   -0.091 
        (-0.794) 
Ocean Freight Rate proxied by 
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Cost of export                                                      -0.992*** 
        (-3.849) 
λ                -0.714 
        (-3.074) 
R2                0.622 
F – Ratio              13.982 
        (3.015) 
DW                1.59 
NB: Figures in parentheses are t-test Values 
***, ** and * represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% probability levels respectively. 
 
 
4.      Conclusion 
 
The aim of the study was to measure the degree of market power in the export demand for Cocoa with focus 
on the Dutch market. With the use of two stage least squares technique after testing for stationarity, 
cointegration and instrumenting for simultaneity, the data covering 1961 – 2007 periods were employed in 
the model estimation. 
 
The first result is that the demand for cocoa increases as the income of the importing country (Netherlands) 
increases. This is a robust finding and consolidates a priori expectation. Second, total production of the non – 
participating countries traces out a positive relationship with demand for cocoa by the importing country, 
contrary to theoretical underpinnings. Third, the coefficient of the price of the substitute crop has a negative 
sign, suggesting an inverse relationship with export demand for cocoa. On the supply relation front, the 
demand for the export crop has a negative sign, indicating decreasing marginal output with respect to cost 
while the proxy for ocean freight rate with its negative sign, imply increasing export cost. The coefficient of 
market power is -0.712 with a Lerner index of 0.122, indicating existence of relative competitiveness in the 
Dutch market. Finally, government intervention in the agricultural export subsector is necessary to revitalize 
the country’s agricultural export capacity and enhance her market power via increased market shares. Output 
needs to grow first before exports can take place. These interventions could be in the form of 
input/production subsidies, targeted export promotion programs, farm settlement, expanded export 
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